SOUTH AFRICA'S DEFENCE STRATEGY

ABDUL S. MINTY

INTRODUCTION BY THE RT REV TREVOR HUDDLESTON CR

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INTRODUCTION

It is a strange paradox of our time that those statesmen, politicians and churchmen who most abhor the label ‘racist’ often defend policies and actions in the international sphere which have the direct result of sustaining racist governments in power.

Nowhere is this paradox more clearly demonstrated than in the area of South-African/Western foreign policy.

It appears possible for British, French and American leaders (of all political parties or of none) to condemn ‘apartheid’ as a doctrine totally opposed to human rights but to support it by encouraging massive investment, arms agreements, technical assistance, and abstention at UNO whenever serious action is proposed.

It is this kind of ‘double-think’ (and double-dealing) which has in fact made the sanctions policy against Rhodesia unworkable. Its motive is, undoubtedly, the prospect of short-term gains in the economic and ideological sphere: to help, for instance, the balance of payments situation in Britain and to counter the threat of Russian and Chinese influence in the southern hemisphere.

Its real consequence will be a race war. As Mr. L. W. Bowman, of Brandeis University is reported to have said: ‘The greatest long-term threat which Southern Africa poses to world stability is . . . the very real possibility that left-leaning guerilla movements will one day be near success, only to have the West intervene on the side of the whites’.

This pamphlet is the most serious and well-documented statement of the position I have so far read. It should be most carefully considered by all in positions of responsibility for world affairs. It should also be studied and digested by those who are engaged in the fight against racism everywhere but who need solid facts and a wide and profound examination of all aspects of South African policies and international relationships to support them. I commend it without reservation.

TREVOR HUDDLESTON, C.R., Bishop of Stepney.

September 1969
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SECTION I

Introduction

South Africa is now an armed camp of over three million Whites. Its gold and diamond exports may soon be supplemented by the export of armaments. The decade of rapid militarization was begun in order to enforce the apartheid system in opposition to the African, Coloured, and Indian populations and to suppress the challenge to White domination in South Africa.

Following the Sharpeville and Langa massacre of Africans in March 1960, both the African National Congress and the newly-formed Pan Africanist Congress were declared illegal, and suppressed. All meaningful methods of non-violent struggle were blocked by repressive legislation, and the full political and military might of the state was brought into play against all who dared to oppose apartheid. It became abundantly clear that the voteless non-white peoples of South Africa would be forced to resort to armed struggle in order to overthrow White domination—the Government reacted to this eventuality by putting White South Africa on a war footing. It deliberately created a ‘war psychosis’ in the White community: the armed forces were provided with special training in methods of anti-guerilla warfare, and senior officers were sent to Algeria for training by the French; housewives were organized in pistol clubs, and even school children were taught target practice. The entire White population was being trained for war against South Africa’s own people, and in 1961 the Defence Minister said, ‘In the same way as the world powers are continually preparing for war, South Africa intends to be ready for internal trouble’. The defence budget rocketed from £22m in 1960 to £60m in 1962—and has continued to increase every year. South Africa intensified its purchase of military equipment from overseas—tanks, aircraft, naval vessels, etc. At the same time the Government embarked on the construction of a massive domestic armaments and ammunition industry in order to reduce its dependence on external sources of weapon supply.

The Arms Build-Up

In the immediate post-Sharpeville era, South Africa’s defence expenditure was principally geared to suppressing the internal challenge to White power, and to intimidating potential guerilla movements. Rapid decolonization in the rest of the Continent, however, created new African states, demanding international action to help end apartheid. The ‘winds of change’ could not be reversed and South Africa’s militarization served an added purpose—to overawe the newly independent African states which spoke passionately about ending White domination in South Africa. A heavily armed South Africa could also defy the United Nations over issues such as South West Africa and in addition present herself as a valuable military ally of the West. For a combination of these reasons, the South African Government spent large sums of money on armaments.
The International Arms Embargo

In March 1960, the outside world was outraged by Sharpeville—seventy-two people were shot dead for peacefully protesting against the Pass Laws—and the brutal measures by which the national upsurge which followed was suppressed. Soon the public boycott campaign was focussed on pressure on Governments for an arms embargo against South Africa. The traditional suppliers of arms came under fire, both from domestic public opinion and from Afro-Asian Governments, to stop supplying all military equipment to South Africa. In Britain, at an Anti-Apartheid Movement rally on 17 March, 1963, the newly-elected Leader of the Labour Party, Harold Wilson, urged the British Government: 'Act now and stop this bloody traffic in the weapons of oppression'. In August that year the United Nations Security Council called on all States 'to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa'. In the same month the United States Government decided to support the United Nations' embargo.

Despite the United Nations' call, South Africa has managed to purchase military equipment from several Western nations. France, in open defiance of the United Nations' resolutions, has increased her arms trade by supplying South Africa with modern aircraft and naval vessels, including a number of Daphne class submarines (capable of 12 knots while submerged) worth £12m. The first submarine, launched at Nantes, has been delivered to the South African Navy. French collaboration with South Africa has reached the stage at which the newspaper *Le Monde* reported in May 1968, 'During the period in which the arms embargo has been supported by the US and Great Britain, France has become the principal supplier of arms to South Africa'.

In Britain, the Conservative Government interpreted the Security Council resolution as applying exclusively to weapons for 'internal suppression' and continued to supply armaments and ammunition for 'external defence'. In October 1964, the Labour Party was elected to power and on 17 November, 1964, Prime Minister Wilson announced a general arms embargo which, he claimed, brought the United Kingdom 'into line with United Nations resolutions'. But there were two major qualifications: all current contracts were to be fulfilled and spare parts for 'equipment sent there' would continue to be supplied. The following week, on 25 November, the Prime Minister informed the House of Commons that the existing contract for the Buccaneer low-flying naval strike aircraft would be supplied but no future orders would be accepted. He went on to explain that 'Her Majesty's Government will, of course, allow the shipment of spares for the 16 Buccaneers as and when required'. The supply of Buccaneer aircraft and the pledge to maintain them with spare parts were a clear violation of the Security Council

*The Security Council met again in December 1963 and appealed to all States to comply with the provisions of the August resolution—Resolution 182, adopted 4 December, 1963.*
decision. A further breach occurred in June 1965, when the Government sanctioned the sale of £400,000 worth of four-wheel-drive Vauxhall motor chassis for armoured cars or lorries to the South African Army. Both the United States and Canadian Governments had already refused licences to local firms to sell similar vehicles to South Africa. Britain continues to supply ammunition for South Africa’s Centurion tanks and 25-pounder guns as well as spare parts for Canberra bombers of the Air Force and the naval Shackletons based in Cape Town. A further loophole is provided by the secret terms of the Simonstown Naval Agreement under which South Africa continues to receive British military equipment. It includes items such as 4.5-inch naval shells — only partially charged so that they may legitimately be described as practice ammunition.

The major loophole in the international arms embargo is the ease, and often enthusiasm, with which Western Governments permit South Africa to purchase licences and blue-prints for military equipment. While the Governments of Britain, the United States, West Germany and Belgium formally pledge support for the arms embargo, they sanction the supply of military know-how, permit their firms to invest capital in South African arms firms, and do nothing to discourage their citizens from migrating to take up posts in the arms firms. Italy and France supply military weapons, permit investment in the South African arms industry, allow skilled technicians to migrate, and sell patents for military equipment.

Even in areas where the boycott has been applied, ingenious arrangements have enabled South Africa to obtain weapons and equipment. For instance, engines for the Impala aircraft being built in South Africa are of British design: the South African licensing arrangement is with an Italian firm, though the original licence comes from Rolls Royce, and work on these engines has been supervised in South Africa by a team from Rolls Royce.

The British and other Western Governments have not been unduly concerned about these lucrative infringements of the Security Council embargo. Indeed, in December 1967, the British Government was about to abandon its partial embargo in response to a reported £200m South African ‘shopping list’. British business ‘groups had already impressed Her Majesty’s Government about the economic wisdom of relaxing the arms embargo. The Labour Government was prevented from doing so, partly because of the prompt action of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in alerting the public and, in particular, the Parliamentary Labour Party which, almost unanimously, opposed this decision.

In France, after the end of General de Gaulle’s rule, it was disclosed that South Africa was France’s third biggest customer for the sale of military equipment in 1968, coming after Israel and Belgium. It led the French newspaper *Le Monde*, to comment: ‘The South African armed forces, among the strongest on the African continent, are equipped with French material, from submarines and radar equipment
to helicopters and Mirage fighter planes. The excuse most often cited by the de Gaulle regime was that the types of weapons furnished by France are unlikely to be used as instruments of repression against the African populations. This, however, is not a very convincing argument, and there is no question that they have been used outside the borders of the Republic, notably in Angola and South West Africa.'

Thus it is evident that the international arms boycott has in the main been circumvented by South Africa with the connivance—if not collaboration of major Western countries.

South Africa’s Armed Power

Inside South Africa the armed forces have been substantially re-organized since 1960. The standing army (the Army, Air Force and Navy) has undergone a steady expansion from 7,721 in 1961 to 17,276 in 1967. By March 1967, the Army stood at 7,559, the Air Force at 4,915, and the Navy at 3,193. In addition the defence establishment included 2,736 administrative personnel, 592 other personnel, 1,609 in auxiliary services and 7,293 non-white labourers.^

The Air Force is equipped with two squadrons of multi-purpose 1,500-mph French Mirage 111-CZs able to operate as fighters, bombers, ground attack or reconnaissance aircraft. The C-130 and Nord Aviation transport planes and French Frelons and Alouette helicopters give ground forces increased mobility. In addition, there are Canberra bombers, Shackleton maritime squadrons, Buccaneers—and Sabre jets equipped with small four-inch air-to-ground missiles produced in South Africa.

The Navy, with air reconnaissance squadrons, has anti-submarine frigates, helicopter carriers, minesweepers with maritime strike aircraft. The first of three Daphne-type submarines has been delivered by France: each of these deep-diving submarines carries twelve torpedoes.^

According to the June 1969 issue of Report from South Africa* the present ground forces ‘actually under arms at any time comprise a 10,000-man professional army, the current intake of more than 20,000 conscripts and the 30,000 man police force’. It goes on to state that ‘within hours’ it is possible to mobilize ‘the 15,000-man police reserve, the 50,000-man “commando” units, and a “citizen-force” reserve made up of men who have completed their full-time national service’.

Western help for South Africa’s Militarization

In order to profit from South Africa’s massive arms build-up, several Western companies have invested heavily in the domestic armaments industry. In 1962, Imperial Chemical Industries of Britain joined with the South African-owned De Beers to re-vitalize the African Explosives and Chemicals Industries Limited with a capital of £5m from each of the two partners. Three armaments factories were to be set up in order to produce tear gas, ammunition for small arms, anti-tank and aircraft rockets for South Africa’s armed forces.

*A monthly publication issued by the South African Embassy, London.
Western companies have also been involved in major military installations. In November 1965, the Marconi Company of Britain erected an expensive radar network with modern equipment along South Africa’s northern frontiers. This detection system can pinpoint hostile aircraft and also guide interceptor fighters to attack the planes.

Early in 1967, Defence Minister Botha announced the decision to install the Decca Radio Navigational Aid System, capable of determining the position of vessels at sea to within 25 yards, thus raising the capabilities of South Africa’s maritime defence. The Decca system, worth £3m, covers the entire coast line from South West Africa in the Atlantic to Natal in the Indian Ocean.

Internal Arms Production

In 1963, partly in response to the international campaign for an arms embargo, intensive research into new weapons was carried out by South Africa.

In April 1963, Defence Minister Fouche said that South Africa could manufacture all the ammunition she needed. On 27 October, 1963, Professor le Roux of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research announced that a new National Institute for Rocket Research would be set up near Pretoria to develop a ground-to-air guided missile. He explained that events in Africa had forced the Government to enter the missile field, since a ground-to-air missile supported by radar was her surest deterrent against ‘enemy attack’. In the same year, Defence Minister Fouche told Parliament: ‘We need rockets. They will have to take the place of many other weapons which are fast becoming obsolete.’ He went on to ask Parliament to vote large sums for defence research: ‘We will simply have to do our own research and make this sort of thing ourselves.’

But in 1963, the London Times and other newspapers reported Professor le Roux’s further revelation that work was also being carried out on developing the poison gases Tabun, Soman and Sarin—all colourless, odourless and tasteless. A grammie of Tabun is said to be able to kill 400 people, while the other two gases are even more lethal. These gases could be sprayed from the air by planes like insect powder. This method of delivery is imperfect, however, since gases sprayed from the air at African locations could also fall on ‘white’ areas. And a more sure delivery system has been sought. In 1965, in a Parliamentary debate, Defence Minister Fouche announced that South Africa had received ‘from a western government a licence to produce in South Africa a bomb of the most modern type’. It is always difficult to speculate about secret military developments but it seems likely that the ‘bomb of the most modern type’ is in fact a nerve-gas bomb. Since it can be aimed more accurately, such a weapon would be ideal for use against African residential areas, should the Government feel threatened by local resistance. It can, of course, also be used against targets across South Africa’s own frontiers. On 7 October, 1966, Economic Planning Minister Haak disclosed that the Council for Industrial and
Scientific Research would be granted over £5m for secret defence research projects to be carried out during that financial year. Earlier, during 1965, Defence Minister Fouche said that South Africa had already obtained 120 licences to manufacture weapons locally and was ‘already practically self-sufficient so far as the production of small weapons, ammunition and explosives were concerned. We would even be able to sell arms which we manufacture in this country to well-disposed friends.’ The principal small arm produced locally is the 7.62mm R1 automatic rifle—an improved version of the FN (the standard NATO rifle) produced under licence from the Fabrique Nationale of Belgium.

As early as 1965, preparations were made to produce military aircraft. By 1967, the Atlas Aircraft Corporation, in one of its factories costing almost £20m, began producing Italian Impala jet aircraft under licence (the Corporation having already recruited a large number of dismissed aircraft workers from Britain).

During 1965, work was also started on a new naval base, in addition to the one at Simonstown.

On 16 December, 1966, Defence Minister Botha mentioned an unspecified new weapon, ‘the result of South African research’, which would soon go into service and be available to ‘those nations which are prepared to co-operate with South Africa’.

In the same year Commandant-General Hiemstra, head of the Armed Forces, said that South Africa’s manufacturers of ‘ploughshares’ could be switched overnight to ‘swords’, and that South Africa would very soon be able to build its own naval craft, including submarines.

During March 1968, Sir Eric Yarrow (Chairman of the British ship-building firm which had built South Africa’s three frigates, Presidents Steyn, Kruger and Pretorius) visited South Africa and saw several Ministers including the Minister of Defence. Before departing, Sir Eric said that he had also had discussions with officials of certain shipyards in Durban and that it was likely that he would exchange ‘know-how’ with them. He went on to say that he would probably expand his interests in South Africa to include the building of warships.

In May 1968, Defence Minister Botha told Parliament that numerous approaches had been made by overseas concerns to establish, jointly with South African firms, armament factories in the Republic. He welcomed this, as it would save South Africa much of the cost of armaments research by making use of overseas ‘know-how’. He went on to introduce the Armaments Amendment Bill and said: ‘It is our duty to be ready for anything in the light of continual meddling in South Africa’s domestic affairs, threats of sanctions and boycotts, and open animosity in certain circles’. The object of the new legislation was to create the Armaments Development and Production Corporation of South Africa—ARMSCOR—a state-owned industry with a share capital of £60m.

South Africa claims to be self-sufficient in various weapons
such as rifles, mortars, ammunition of various calibres including grenades, smoke-bombs, aerial bombs and explosives. Other developments include South Africa's own napalm bomb, announced in March 1968, an anti-armour mine which is claimed to be much cheaper than the imported product, two types of shrapnel mines and a night-sight for infantry rifles.

In August 1968, Dorman Long (Africa) Ltd undertook to build locally the first naval vessel—a R500,000 torpedo recovery vessel for the South African navy.

On 9 October, 1968, Defence Minister Botha announced that a missile base was to be established on the Zululand coast. He explained that the base and test site would be on a 10-mile-wide strip of land stretching from Cape Vidal in the south to Ochre Hill in the north. The area is about 150 miles from Durban. It would take in a parallel belt of the ocean and also incorporate part of St Lucia Lake. The Minister went on to say that the site was 'of great strategic value in that personnel could be stationed there permanently'. The base would serve scientific and industrial research in armament production organizations as well as the army, navy and air force. *

On 17 December, 1968, the first rocket was successfully fired from the new rocket-launching range at St Lucia Bay. A talk broadcast by Radio Johannesburg on the following day claimed that the rockets were defensive and not offensive weapons. The broadcaster went on to say that South Africa did not need West German assistance because she had her own resources.

In addition to the St Lucia Bay launching range South Africa has an operational military base in the Caprivi strip in South West Africa which could also be used as a rocket launching base—the Caprivi strip which juts right into Zambia is over one thousand miles away from South Africa's own borders.

In 1969, Defence Minister Botha announced that, in cooperation with a French electronics firm, South Africa had developed the Cactus air defence system, 'the most advanced and effective of its kind in existence'.

These are only a few examples to indicate South Africa's rapid militarization and the development of a massive armaments industry with the co-operation and support of Western business firms and certain Governments.

South Africa's Nuclear Potential

With this arms build-up, there has been considerable anxiety about the likelihood of South Africa developing her own nuclear weapons.

In April 1965, the Director-General of the South African Atomic Energy Board announced that its first nuclear reactor, SAFARI 1, had 'gone critical'. SAFARI 1, costing almost £3m, was designed to work on a relatively new concept of nuclear *South Africa has a rocket research Institute near Pretoria which was established about five years ago to develop ground to air missiles. (See supra.)
power using natural uranium with heavy water as a moderator and sodium as a coolant—a system unsuccessfully attempted in the United States and for which the South Africans were seeking patent protection.

During July 1968, the Chief Executive of Sodeteg, the French corporation making nuclear devices, visited South Africa on a private mission. When representatives of the Portuguese Atomic Energy Commission visited South Africa, the Chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Board, Dr Roux, said their visit should be seen as a further step towards intimate co-operation between Portugal and South Africa in the nuclear field.

Dr Roux also disclosed that South Africa co-operated in the nuclear field with the United States, France, Britain and Portugal.

In August 1965, when inaugurating South Africa’s first nuclear reactor, the then Prime Minister, Verwoerd said: ‘South Africa is one of the foremost uranium-producing countries in the world. It is the duty of South Africa not only to consider the military uses of the material but also to do all in its power to direct its uses for peaceful purposes’ (our italics).8

South Africa has plenty of uranium and also has substantial capital but had, until comparatively recently, limited expertise. West Germany, on the other hand, debarred from producing nuclear weapons on her territory, has considerable expertise and there has been widespread speculation about collaboration between South Africa and West Germany.

SECTION II

South Africa’s Role in Africa

A major aspect of South Africa’s overall strategy in maintaining white domination internally is to win allies, and extend her influence abroad, particularly in the African sub-continent. Her traditional and natural allies are Portugal and Rhodesia and together they constitute the anti-liberation Unholy Alliance in Southern Africa. They maintain extensive military and police co-operation, and closer communication and economic links have been established in recent years. None of the partners confesses to a formal pact but regular consultations take place between South Africa, the dominant partner, and the other two members. Prime Minister Vorster explains that mutual security and other arrangements are possible because they ‘understand one another’—good neighbours do not need formal agreements in order to help each other.

The White Alliance

With Smith’s seizure of independence from Britain in November 1965, South Africa has been forced to come openly to the rescue of the white minority regime in Rhodesia. The international economic sanctions policy, initiated half-heartedly by Britain, has been reduced to a farce
by South Africa acting as a go-between to facilitate Rhodesian trade with the rest of the world: Rhodesia has virtually become an economic colony of South Africa. But whilst Pretoria is prepared to sustain the rebellion, initially she was anxious for a quick settlement with Britain. It was felt that so long as Rhodesia remained an issue of dispute with Britain, South Africa could not feel confident of the stability of the region. It could be a hindrance to the policy of creating better understanding between South Africa and other African states such as Zambia. Any settlement would, however, have to be one which would be acceptable to South Africa. In 1967, when the Smith regime felt threatened by the first African National Congress-Zimbabwe African Peoples Union guerrilla offensive in the Zambesi Valley, South African reinforcements were rushed to the scene—although Rhodesia did not formally request them—under the general policy of combating African freedom fighters 'wherever we are allowed to'. The failure of any meaningful response from Britain to this blatant intervention in a British colony gave South Africa increased self-confidence, and Prime Minister Vorster, in a speech reported in the Johannesburg Star, warned that South Africa would not allow anybody from outside to interfere with the stability of Southern Africa. A Government Sunday newspaper interpreted this speech as a clear warning to Britain and an indication that South Africa would not allow any move in Rhodesia which would upset South Africa's interests in the region. At a rally in Nelspruit the following week, Vorster said that he wanted Britain to remember that South Africa would never withdraw from southern Africa as the former colonial power had done.*

The intervention in Rhodesia was meant not only to defend the Smith regime, but to demonstrate the realities of South Africa's wider 'sphere of influence' policy in the region as a whole. Britain has in effect succumbed to this 'regional influence' doctrine. Following South Africa's intervention in Rhodesia, and Vorster's speeches, Britain began to have 'talks about talks' not so much with Rhodesia but with South Africa. Throughout 1968, a series of consultations took place between South African Ministers and representatives of the British Government. The South African Foreign Minister visited Downing Street for talks with Harold Wilson, and British Cabinet Ministers have repeatedly declared that in no circumstances is Britain prepared to confront white South Africa. Thus it has become abundantly clear that the determining factor in the British attitude on Rhodesia is that any settlement must be acceptable to South Africa; this virtually subjects British policy in Southern Africa to the dictates of the South African Government.

*This emphasized the new aggressive posture of the Government. Dr Verwoerd, for example, had expressed anxiety at relinquishing control over South West Africa because it might be used as a base against the apartheid laager. Now, the laager is extended—South West Africa is part of South Africa, and intervention in Rhodesia effectively extends South Africa's security frontier northwards. Will the security frontier stop at Rhodesia?
Portugal's African War

Portugal, South Africa's other traditional ally, has for several years been losing ground to freedom fighters in her African colonies. She too has had to rely on South African assistance, and joint military manoeuvres have taken place in Mozambique and elsewhere. Portugal, a NATO member, has been using NATO equipment in her war against African resistance fighters. Frelimo (the Mozambique Liberation Front) and other freedom movements have repeatedly drawn attention to the use of NATO weapons and aircraft in the African war. These charges have always been denied by other NATO members, who have not even called an enquiry to examine the evidence, despite the production of weapons bearing clear NATO markings.

Following the Frelimo Congress held inside Mozambique in July 1968, its President, the late Dr E. Mondlane, told the Nationalist of Dar-es-Salaam: 'We know that they are increasing their forces of white soldiers and they have intensified inside Mozambique the forced conscription of Africans. They get a lot of aid from NATO countries and the apartheid regime of South Africa is deeply involved—it has many of its military officers fighting in Mozambique. Countries like West Germany, it is well known to us, are training white Portuguese soldiers in Portugal in counter-insurgence techniques. In short, we are fighting Portugal and all her NATO allies.'

Dr Neto, President of the Peoples’ Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has also repeatedly drawn attention to the assistance given to Portugal by Bonn and other NATO states.

NATO Weapons

But it is not only in her colonies that Portugal has been using NATO equipment. Her growing desperation at the success of African freedom fighters has led to repeated attacks on several independent African states. For example, on 5 August, 1967, it was reported that troops from Portuguese Guinea in West Africa carried out a ‘reprisal raid’ into neighbouring Senegalese territory and the Portuguese burnt several frontier villages. Tanzania is another country which has also been attacked repeatedly. In June 1967, the Tanzanian Second Vice-President, Mr R. Kawawa, responded by condemning Portugal for ‘flagrant aggression against the innocent people of Tanzania’. The Tanzanian border was ‘often violated by the Portuguese in their savage acts of repression’. Zambia is yet another country subjected to raids. On 11 April, 1968, President Kaunda denounced ‘the latest bombing raid on Zambia’. These incursions into other countries are not merely technical infringements—they threaten the security and peace of border areas and kill civilians in the region. The Zambian boundary raid—on 6 April, 1968—on three villages in the Kalabo District killed six people and wounded twenty others. ‘Portugal’, the President declared, ‘is engaged in acts of undeclared war against Zambia. Soon it will be imperative for us to consider taking retaliatory measures.’ On 1 December, 1968, Portuguese
aircraft once again bombed Zambian villages, and eighteen incendiary bombs were dropped in a village near Chipata. On the 6 December, it was announced that Portugal had accepted responsibility for six separate incidents, earlier in 1968, involving her armed forces in shelling or bombing villages on Zambia’s borders with Angola and Mozambique. The Portuguese were satisfied ‘without doubt’ that their armed forces were responsible for the actions, and offered to pay compensation to Zambia.

In December 1968, five Labour back-benchers visited Zambia and testified to the use of NATO equipment by Portugal against a Commonwealth member. Like past complaints, these too failed to produce any decisive response from the British Labour Government or other NATO members. In February 1969, Mr Wilson told the Commons that the fact of ‘attacks on Zambian villages is not in dispute’—how could it be when the Portuguese had already admitted it?—but he maintained that there was no evidence of NATO arms having been used for the purpose. Two months later, on 30 April, 1969 the London Times reported a visit to Zambia by Mr C. Brocklebank-Fowler, former Chairman of the Conservative Bow Group, who found ‘incontrovertible evidence’ of aggression against that member of the Commonwealth by Britain’s NATO ally, Portugal. He visited two villages near the Mozambique border: ‘One—Chimpomi—had been the subject of an air attack, strafed by a Portuguese light aircraft with 37mm SNB rockets which are made in France and used by NATO.’ Instead of consistently maintaining that ‘no evidence’ of this nature exists, even though it has been repeatedly presented, why is nothing done by NATO members to put an end to the use of NATO equipment by Portugal in her colonial wars?

Neighbouring African States

Although South African police officers have been arrested inside Zambian territory and returned to the Republic, Pretoria has not yet made any direct attack against an African state. She conducts reconnaissance flights over neighbouring territories and has allocated a special security fund for what the South African press describe as ‘CIA-type’ activities in these territories. This newly established Bureau of State Security (referred to as BOSS) with a large budget of almost £3m, ‘will operate on a scale that will take its operatives beyond the country’s borders’.

After the June 1966 Middle-East war, however, there was considerable speculation about an Israeli-type action against Zambia and Tanzania, countries which share a firm anti-apartheid policy and support the African Liberation Movement. The Israeli experience provoked great interest in Government circles. The argument which obsessed white South Africa was that if South Africa were to carry out lighting attacks on Zambia and Tanzania then the international community would take several days, if not longer, to convene a debate at the United Nations. There is very little that the United Nations can do effectively about South Africa so
long as the major Western powers remain well-disposed towards her, and as it is inconceivable that any Western power would be prepared to 'confront' South Africa, there would not be very much at risk. In September 1967, South Africa's top Army and Air Force officers learnt at first hand about Israel's tactics in the Middle-East War from General Mordechai Hod, Commander of the Israeli Air Force. He addressed between 50 and 100 officers at the Air Force College, Voortrekkerhoogte. According to the Johannesburg *Sunday Express* a spokesman said afterwards, 'It was an intensely interesting lecture, which made it apparent that the tactics employed by the Israeli Air Force were brilliant. The Israelis seem to have been as clever as a cartload of monkeys. It was thrilling to hear General Hod describe the campaign and all those present were filled with admiration. I think he taught us a lot, particularly about the importance of the flexibility of the mind in military tactics.'

South Africa has not found it necessary to attack openly any independent African state because she does not feel an 'Israel in Africa'. With the rapid decolonization of central and southern African territories Pretoria has instead paid special attention to forging economic and political links with the new states. In August 1968, Agriculture Minister Uys explained South Africa's outward-looking policy in Africa. 'Just think', he said. 'What if we have in addition to the terrorist threat to South West Africa and Rhodesia, terrorists in Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho and Malawi. This is why we must take these changed circumstances in Africa into account.' He went on to say that South Africa had to strengthen her economy and gain the world's confidence so as to make herself indispensable to the world. 'The stronger we are the less they can touch us . . . this is our guarantee for the future.'

The three territories of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland were already economic hostages to South Africa when they achieved statehood. South African Ministers attended their independence celebrations and have since assiduously tried to establish closer mutual 'understanding'. Malawi, under Dr Hastings Banda, has been opened up for South Africa's economic penetration, and already white South Africans are in charge of various Government departments. There is also a South African military attaché stationed in Blantyre.

**Evolving Entente Relationships**

Thus, the traditional pattern of a triple white Unholy Alliance has been reinforced by a wider Southern African system of white and black Governments operating within the apartheid orbit—with South Africa being the dominant member of this evolving partnership.

Prime Minister Vorster has said that unless a wider Southern African concept becomes a reality 'the destruction and infection' of Communism would spread from the north. It is because of this that there exists 'understanding' between South Africa and her neighbouring states. South Africa has 'the best possible relationship with Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Rhodesia and Malawi', while the South Africans
and Portuguese ‘understand one another’. But he went on, ‘Not only this... the time will come when Zambia and South Africa will understand each other. We will understand each other not only because of good relationships and everything that will flow from these relationships, but because of the need for Southern Africa to be kept free of Communist infiltration.’ In the interests of Southern Africa ‘we will be obliged to close our ranks—and here I include Zambia’.  

Despite Zambia’s clear stand against apartheid, the South African Government considers her a potential ally. This optimism is based partly on the fact that, as a result of the Rhodesia boycott, South Africa has become Zambia’s chief trading partner; that Zambian mining capital is partly South African owned; and that her access to the coast is via Unholy Alliance-controlled territory. Every month South Africa supplies Zambia with tons of dynamite to keep her mines working, and Rhodesia controls her electricity supply from the Kariba dam. Despite pressures, Zambia is deliberately pursuing a policy of disengagement from the white-rulled Southern African economic and political system.

But there are ever increasing pressures to reach an ‘understanding’ with South Africa and the Unholy Alliance. Arrangements have been completed for the construction of the massive Cabora-Bassa dam in Mozambique. The Johannesburg Sunday Times suggests that neighbouring countries such as ‘Zambia and Tanzania will perhaps join South Africa and Malawi later as main consumers of power from the scheme’. The Cabora-Bassa dam, the biggest in Africa, is to be constructed by a South African-led international consortium, ZAMCO, and is expected to generate 17,000m kilowatts a year.* When this is completed, it is intended to build an artificial port at the mouth of the Zambezi River which will then be navigable from the Indian Ocean up to the town of Tete. This proposed artificial port of Cuama, together with a railway link, could be made available to Zambia to export her copper—as an alternative to the proposed Tanzam railway link between Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam.

Those African states which have developed economic and political links with South Africa often find it necessary to defend the apartheid regime both to their own people and internationally. For example, following the ANC-ZAPU offensive in Rhodesia during 1967, Dr Banda informed his Congress Party that though formal diplomatic links were to be established with South Africa ‘our mission is not intended for the Trojan horses of subversion’. He went on to comment about the white regimes: ‘They will not wait to be invaded. First they will cross their borders to meet the enemy wherever he is likely to appear on the principle that attack is the best form of defence.’

Dr Banda has secured considerable financial assistance from South Africa, which is making available an initial R8m long-term loan to build Malawi’s new capital city at Lilongwe. South Africa has also lent Malawi £6m to construct a new

*The Portuguese intend to create a white settlement of over one million immigrants around the new dam.
railway line to link Malawi to the Mozambique port of Nacala.

The Malawi Minister of Trade and Industry, Aleke Banda, while on a visit to South Africa in 1968, suggested that South African industrialists would have markets throughout Africa if they set up factories in Malawi. Goods carrying the 'made in Malawi' label would reach African markets at present denied to them. He went on to 'assure South Africans that their investments in Malawi will be safe'.

The Johannesburg Sunday Times reported, in September 1968, that visiting South African Ministers received 'flattering red-carpet' treatment from the Malawi Government. The same newspaper quoted Aleke Banda: 'We know other states are looking more sympathetically towards our South African policy, and some are already beginning to see the benefits, especially the economic benefits of dealing with South Africa'. It is also stated that, according to sources close to the Malawi Government, 'Kenya and Malagasy may be the next African states to enter into trade and diplomatic relations with South Africa'. Kenya denied this, but the Malagasy Republic has since sent an official delegation to Pretoria and may become the first ex-French state to establish formal ties with South Africa. In April 1969, it was announced that South African Airways had made an agreement with Air Madagascar (the Malagasy Republic's official airline) to maintain and fly their Boeing 737 aircraft which will operate between Tananarive and Johannesburg as from September 1969. The Malagasy aircraft are therefore being built to the same specification as those operated by South African Airways. In a recent issue of the influential American journal, Foreign Affairs, the author of an article entitled South Africa: Are There Silver Linings? claims that Gabon, Chad and Upper Volta have already had 'amiable contacts regarding possible diplomatic relations with South Africa'.

The South African ship MV Good Fortune was registered in Panama in July 1968. D. J. Venter, of the new company, Nautiker Lines, said: 'We believe that South Africa must be flexible when it comes to international trade. It is clear that some of the countries with which we wish to trade will not welcome the South African flag, so for the sake of successful trading we have decided to register the ship in Panama.' The Good Fortune was to operate from Cape Town to Mauritius, Madagascar, Reunion and the Seychelles, circumventing the boycott of South African goods and ships imposed by the Organization for African Unity.

The Role of Capital

South Africa is able to establish ties of 'understanding' with African states because of her vast reserves and surplus capital available for profitable investment in other countries. From time to time the South African press discusses the many different plans aimed at producing links with other African states. One such plan was outlined by the white Opposition spokesman on Finance, Dr C. F. Jacobs, in April 1969: he told Parliament that the Government should use its reserves of £525m to make loans to other countries—'the
Government should capitalize on this invisible weapon to make South Africa a capital-exporting country." According to the London Daily Telegraph\textsuperscript{15} this idea first came from a young banker called Hans Weiss who said: "Such loans offered to neighbouring African states need not be tied to import of goods and services but could be used to improve their economic structure. This would lead to closer economic ties with South Africa and further the idea of a southern Africa free-trade bloc, which is something Dr Verwoerd wanted to promote." He suggested that interest and repayment would be made in convertible currencies—of which South Africa is short—which would help to balance her current account deficit.

Official circles in South Africa believe that in view of the restricted aid and investment programmes of several Western nations, partly due to balance of payments problems, South Africa has a better opportunity for economic penetration of the African continent. This potential role for South African capital even led the Ghanaian Secretary to the Economic Commission for Africa, Robert Gardiner, to advocate more liberal policies towards the white regimes in order to benefit economic development in Africa.

Foreign Minister Muller said, in August 1968, that a major factor determining the policies of Western powers towards South Africa was not so much internal colour policy but its ability to live in peace and co-operation with other African states. "As the West becomes aware of our fruitful co-operation with other African states, their attitude towards us improves. I believe that it will happen to an increasing degree because we must simply accept that our relations with the rest of the world are largely determined by our relations with the African states. In this connexion we are giving the world considerable food for thought." In November 1968, speaking of South Africa's readiness to give technical and other aid to African states, Prime Minister Vorster said: "We have a measure of self-interest—and I do not attempt to hide this—in the development and prosperity of Africa, but it is not self-interest alone that motivates us. . . . We have a sense of mission in respect of Africa. In addition, providence has been very good to us in Africa and we want to return to Africa something of this. . . . This is the spirit that inspires us—and this is the spirit that will conquer Africa." \textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Western Participation}

South Africa is inevitably attractive to overseas businessmen as a launching pad for economic penetration in the rest of Africa. The Republic's 'outward-looking' foreign policy holds economic and political benefits for the apartheid regime but is also promising for subsidiaries of foreign companies in South Africa. In March 1969, Lord Stokes, Chairman and Managing Director of the British Leyland Motor Corporation, announced in Johannesburg that the South African subsidiary, LEYKOR, planned to invest R10.5m during the current year. He anticipated that development would spread north from South Africa. "You have to take the long-term view in
business. We want, therefore, to be established here in our own right.'

With the rapid growth of South Africa’s engineering and electronics industry, European and American motor cars are assembled in the Republic with as much as 65 per cent local content. But these new plants in South Africa are also exporting motor vehicle components to Europe. For example, in June 1968 it was reported that the Ford group had decided to import to Britain motor-car-engine blocks and bearing caps from South Africa. During the following twelve months the Ford Company in Britain was due to import a total amount of 35,000 engine blocks worth £588,000—enabling 10 per cent of all Ford Escort cars to carry South African-made components. Thus, subsidiaries of international companies in South Africa expand their production in order to meet these new requirements rather than increasing the capacity and plants of these firms in Europe or North America. Other examples reflecting this trend are that the Siemens factory near Pretoria is to supply transistors to Siemens of Canada, and Dunlop’s Durban factory has contracted to supply Dunlop Canada with 41,000 cycle tyres.

The apartheid system provides a pool of cheap African labour which results in low production costs, and industrial goods can be manufactured cheaply in South Africa. Thus, overseas entrepreneurs such as Lord Stokes are ready to increase their investments in the Republic with a view to marketing products in Africa, as well as other Southern Hemispheric countries. But in addition to its role as a base for the economic penetration of these regions, the Republic is also increasing its exports of manufactured goods to the ‘developed’ countries. Of all imports to the United Kingdom during 1964, 9 per cent comprised manufactured items, whereas, in 1967, the figure was 40.5 per cent.

SECTION III

The British Stake in South Africa

The British stake in apartheid is enormous. Britain has over £1,200m invested in South Africa (almost two-thirds of total foreign investment in that country). She receives dividends from direct and portfolio investment calculated at more than £100m a year. In 1967, Britain exported £257m worth of goods to South Africa and imported from her goods costing £219m (excluding gold). In this two-way trade, the balance has always been in Britain’s favour and South Africa alternates with Australia as her second biggest customer.

South Africa boasts that investment in apartheid yields the world’s highest return. In 1967, the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association in London stated that the ‘average return on investments in the Republic has been calculated to

*‘Manufactured’ is classified by the Board of Trade to include (1) manufactured goods classified chiefly by material (2) machinery and transport equipment and (3) miscellaneous manufactured articles. See Appendix II.*
be about 15 per cent'.* In March 1969, the American journal, *Business Week*, reported that according to a survey just carried out, South Africa had the attraction of an investment return of between 17 and 26 per cent. It is not surprising, therefore, that the most active and enthusiastic lobbyists for the apartheid regime in Western capitals are business and finance groups.

In October 1968, the President of the Board of Trade, Anthony Crosland, addressing the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association said: 'It has always been my Government’s view that political differences should not be allowed to interfere with the growth of trade'. During 1968, fourteen British trade missions toured South Africa for orders and, for 1969, the Board of Trade is encouraging twenty such missions  because ‘we wish to develop the best possible export position with South Africa’. Despite South Africa’s role as the major saboteur of sanctions against Rhodesia, Crosland went on to say: ‘We have made it clear that we cannot contemplate any economic confrontation’.†

Other Trading Partners

Other Western countries also have a growing stake in South Africa.

West Germany has been paying special attention to increasing trade with South Africa. In 1967, West Germany imported goods worth R187.9m from South Africa and exported R223.8m, making South Africa the second biggest overseas market for West German products. German private investment in South Africa amounts to about R140m.

In November 1968, the United States Trade Consul to South Africa said that his country had 601m dollars invested in South Africa by the end of 1966. During 1967, South Africa took 40 per cent of the 1.1 billion dollars worth of goods exported by the United States to Africa and supplied 25 per cent of the 890 million dollars’ worth imported from Africa.‡

A survey published by the Johannesburg *Financial Mail*, stated that France’s exports to South Africa increased by 135 per cent between 1961 and 1967 (with non-military exports amounting to R54m). It also ranked France as the third biggest foreign investor in South Africa after Britain and the United States.

The survey also published comparable figures for other countries, reflecting the increase in their exports to South Africa between 1961 and 1967: Japan—205 per cent; Italy—205 per cent; Italy

*Purpose and Progress 1965-1967*, issued by the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association Limited. It also stated that apart from portfolio investment, in which gold shares are a traditional and important feature, there are many manufacturing subsidiaries of United Kingdom firms in South Africa. Shell, ICI, Courtaulds, Fisons, BMC, British Metal Box Co and other big industrial groups have large interests and often form the greater part of South African industries. Most of our major car and commercial vehicle manufacturers have assembly or manufacturing plants in South Africa.’

†The following month the British Ambassador in South Africa reiterated this assurance by saying that his Government had always set itself against an economic confrontation with South Africa. (Star 16.11.68.)
States—83 per cent; and Britain—71 per cent.

According to the 1967 trade figures, South Africa was 17th in international trade, with total exports of R1.362m and imports worth R1.914m. In September 1968, South Africa’s Ambassador in London said that his country now ranked among the top twelve trading nations with exports of R1.500m and imports of R1.880m, in 1968.24

An examination of South Africa’s world trade shows that her major trading partners include Britain, the United States, and West Germany, France and other EEC countries, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with increasing attention being paid to trade with South American and African states. It is from her major trading partners that South Africa derives comfort and support at the United Nations and elsewhere.

SECTION IV

South Africa’s Military Calculations

With Britain proposing, for reasons of economy, to contract her defence role, South Africa has concentrated on expanding her naval forces in preparation for assuming new ‘responsibilities’ in the Southern Hemisphere.

The British-South African Simonstown Naval Agreement, first signed in June 1955, was re-negotiated in 1967. Following bilateral talks in Cape Town in January 1967, Defence Minister Botha reported that ‘mutually agreeable arrangements’ had been made about continued British-South African co-operation over the Cape route in view of Britain’s proposal to withdraw her Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, and the remaining British frigate from Simonstown. He went on to say that the Chief of the South African Navy would assume ‘greater responsibilities for the defence of the sea route round the Cape in the event of war’ (our italics). On 8 February, the House of Commons was told by the Secretary for the Navy, Maurice Foley, that Britain would maintain a naval officer of the rank of Commodore with a small staff in Cape Town to liaison with the South African Navy, and that Britain would continue to use the Simonstown and other naval facilities and have the use of communications provided by the South African Naval Radio. A senior British naval officer described the new agreement as ‘recognition that the South African Navy had grown up’.

Her Majesty’s Government places considerable importance on the Simonstown naval arrangements with South Africa. In June 1967, Labour Members of Parliament criticized the Government’s decision to send warships to visit Cape Town. The Anti-Apartheid Movement protested to Downing Street. In reply, Prime Minister Wilson defended the need for Britain to preserve its military pact with South Africa. He wrote: ‘While I recognize the reasons which prompted you to write, you will know that the Government maintain under the Simonstown Agreement, certain defence facilities in South Africa which are useful to us and which involve liaison with the South African Navy, . . .’

—153 per cent; West Germany—113 per cent; the United
Hemispheric Power

South Africa claims that Russia is interested in filling the power vacuum in the Southern Hemisphere which will be created by Britain’s withdrawal from the Indian Ocean in 1970. Since 1967, South African policy has been designed to persuade Britain and other Western Powers to join with her in protecting and defending Western interests in the Southern Hemisphere. South Africa’s ‘anti-Communism’ can serve to forge fresh military links with the West, either by the West expanding existing military alliances such as NATO to include South Africa, or by the creation of a new regional pact.

In October 1968, Foreign Minister Muller stated that South Africa ‘cannot wait forever while Communist pressures increase on Africa’. South African Ministers have repeatedly complained that the West has failed to respond positively to the threat of Communism in the Southern Hemisphere: because of the current reticence of the West to incorporate South Africa as a formal defence ally the Southern Hemisphere will have to look after its own defences, ‘and this is what it is doing’.

Accordingly, in May 1968, Defence Minister Botha told Parliament that South Africa had taken part in a secret international conference ‘at service level’ with friendly nations of the Southern Hemisphere about joint defence of sea routes. ‘We are now prepared to play a bigger role in this connexion (keeping the Cape route open). This policy was recently discussed at an international conference at service level and it was decided to make important recommendations to the Governments involved. . . . It will be interesting to see whether the Governments involved will be prepared to accept the sensible recommendations adopted at this conference.’

South Africa is eager to establish a military alliance in the Southern Hemisphere. In April 1969, Prime Minister Vorster informed Parliament that his Government was having talks ‘at the highest level’ with certain nations. At that time Die Transvaler, a Government newspaper, said: ‘The Indian Ocean links these two Powers (Australia and New Zealand) with the Republic. The southern part of the Atlantic Ocean is also for South American Powers, such as the Argentine, Uruguay and Brazil, a common area.’ In view of subsequent developments it can be assumed that the countries mentioned were parties to the talks—together with South Africa’s colonial ally, Portugal.

In the latest Defence White Paper, published on 23 April, 1969, the Government outlines South Africa’s future defence contributions as protecting the Cape sea route in the event of a world conflict. The Defence Paper states: ‘Although official recognition overseas of the Republic’s strategic importance remains in abeyance, there are indications of an awareness in this respect in public opinion as reflected in the overseas Press and utterances by important figures. The considerable harbour and repair facilities at Simonstown and elsewhere in our country, as well as the modern communication and control facilities, all provided at great expense, are indispensable to
Allied naval forces in the Southern Atlantic and Indian Ocean areas."

The 1969 Defence White Paper discloses a total defence expenditure programme of nearly £1,000m over the next five years, aimed at increasing the striking force of South Africa’s armed services. Considerable importance is placed on expanding South Africa’s maritime facilities—e.g. building a new tidal basin and submarine base at Simonstown—as well as obtaining fast patrol boats, spotter aircraft, and an enlarged helicopter force equipped with guided missiles. The Paper also provides for the construction of a world-wide communication radio network at Westlake (to replace the old Cape Naval Radio). This project, costing over £6m, with 50 per cent local content, will enable South Africa’s maritime command to keep in touch at any time with any ship or aircraft operating between South America and Australia.

Thus, as part of the major aim to forge a regional alliance with the Western Powers, South Africa has set about increasing its military power and maritime facilities to make itself an attractive—if not indispensable—allly of the West.

SATO

Australia has often sided with South Africa in international affairs and has much else in common with the Republic. Portugal, as a colonial power in Africa is South Africa’s close ally. Her Defence Minister, General Viami Rebelo visited the Republic early in 1969, and Defence Minister Botha went to Lisbon in return to have talks with both General Rebelo and Dr Caetano.

But it is the presence of Argentina that reveals an extension of South African interest in both the economic and military fields. The South African Government calculates that since countries in South America and Southern Africa have a common interest in defending the South Atlantic, there are valid reasons for both sides to establish close economic and political links.

Foreign Minister Muller has paid repeated visits to South American countries in order to forge these links, and the developments were discussed in the Johannesburg Star of 12 April, 1969. It considered the possibility of a defence pact—a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation—as a counter to Russian intentions in Africa and Asia: ‘A Soviet task force of 20 warships has been cruising in the North Atlantic ... a similar fleet may show the Red Flag in the South Atlantic too.’ The editorial went on to say that this explained what the South African Foreign Minister Muller ‘was doing in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro the other day. He certainly discussed common security concerns with the Government of Argentina—a pragmatically-minded country whose navy has already taken part in joint exercises with South Africa’s. These are early days to talk about a South Atlantic Treaty Organization. Indeed, a formal defence pact of this kind is highly unlikely in the context of present sentiment at the United Nations, where the Latin Americans tend to vote as a bloc against apartheid.
Nevertheless, it is as well to be thinking in terms of regional links across the Atlantic. They represent another facet of South Africa’s promising “outward” foreign policies. Ultimately they may—who knows?—help us to help the free world accept our friendship without embarrassment.’

Whilst Foreign Minister Muller denied discussing a formal defence pact, he conceded that his talks with the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Brazil and Argentina centred around the topic of ‘Communist penetration of the South Atlantic’. The London Daily Telegraph reported: “South Africa is clearly doing her best to promote, if not formal links, active military co-operation”.

In May 1969, twelve months after Defence Minister Botha’s revelation of a secret defence conference ‘at service level’ with Southern Hemisphere countries, Admiral Pedro Alberto Jose Gnavi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy, visited South Africa as the official guest of the Defence Department. Argentina has since appointed a Naval Attaché to its embassy in Pretoria and South Africa has sent a Commodore to Argentina to liaise with Admiral Gnavi’s Navy. Early in 1969 South African Navy units paid courtesy visits to Argentina.

Whether Argentina or Brazil will enter into a formal naval agreement with South Africa (and Portugal?) is uncertain but, so far, secret discussions have resulted in joint naval exercises: a de facto alliance is certainly emerging.

As for Australia, a trade delegation visit in August 1968 was interpreted by a pro-Government newspaper as a prelude to a possible naval alliance. The South African Financial Gazette went on to report that Australia had already indicated its desire to sell South Africa the Ikara anti-submarine torpedo system developed in Australia.

Economic Links with South America

Several tours by Foreign Minister Muller since 1967 have resulted in an expansion and strengthening of diplomatic links with South American countries. In addition to discussions about political and military arrangements considerable attention has been paid to expanding South African economic interests in South America. In November 1968, it was revealed that South Africa had purchased bonds worth R1,800,000 from the Inter-American Development Bank, a development finance organization to which all South American states, except Cuba, belong. Economics Minister Haak said that South Africa had given her contractors and exporters further opportunities to participate—on a cash basis—in development projects which are financed by the Bank (South African Reserve Bank) in South American countries. South African firms are beginning to win major international tenders for construction projects. A South African company, General Mining and Finance Limited, has already landed a contract to build a ten-mile irrigation tunnel in Peru costing about $50 million.

*During October-November 1968, South African Navy units also paid courtesy visits to Australia where civic receptions were held at the three ports of call, Fremantle, Sydney and Melbourne (Johannesburg Star, 16 November, 1968).*
R15.5m. Completion of the work will take about five years. In March 1969, Peru placed the first order, worth R110,000, from South America for South African-produced urea with African Explosives and Chemical Industries Ltd. With a view to facilitating business contacts, in February 1969 South African Airways inaugurated a new weekly service to South America: this Johannesburg-Rio-New York route is expected to run at a loss for the first year. A Bloemfontein daily newspaper, The Friend, made the following comment: ‘The South African national air carrier has now extended its operations across more than half the southern hemisphere, from Australia to South America. These are two continents recently visited by units of the South African Navy. It is not suggested that the new air route is a case of trade following the flag; but South Africa, Australia and Brazil do have commercial as well as strategic interests in common in the southern oceans. Everything that brings them closer together in whatever sphere, is to their mutual benefit.’

There are interests in Britain which wish to participate actively in South Africa’s economic penetration of South America. When the Director General of the Confederation of British Industries, John Davies, returned from his visit to South Africa in the summer of 1968, he proposed a combination of South African capital and British technical skill to be used in third countries such as those in South America.

Portugal in South America

Portugal, already linked with Western Powers through joint membership of NATO, is following South Africa’s example in establishing new political, military and economic links with South American countries. Thus, in July 1969, Prime Minister Caetano of Portugal prepared to leave for Brazil. The London Financial Times carried a dispatch from its Lisbon Correspondent who said that the visit would include talks about increasing trade between the two countries. ‘Of far greater significance, however, will be political considerations, and here it is relevant to note that with Dr Caetano will be Foreign Minister Dr Nogueira and top aides from the Ministry’s African Affairs Department. . . . Almost certainly high on the agenda for discussions is an idea tentatively suggested by the Portuguese for a Southern Atlantic defence pact that would include Brazil, the Portuguese African territories of Angola and Mozambique and South Africa.’ The article then quotes from a front-page report of a Portuguese newspaper, Diario de Noticias: ‘The South Atlantic is a Luso-African-Brazilian sea. Cape Verde is there for the defence of the South Atlantic with the Azores for the communications in the North Atlantic. And as Portugal’s African provinces on the west coast face Brazil, so are they the key to a defence strategy which Brazil cannot ignore at a time when Soviet ships make frequent incursions along the coasts of Brazil and Angola and it has been proved that they unload war material destined for subversive

*South Africa has a weekly air service to Australia and it is reported in the 1969 Barclays Bank Overseas Survey, published in London, that ‘an air connection with Israel is under consideration’.
elements.' The Financial Times Correspondent points out that suggestions for a South Atlantic pact are in line with Portugal’s oft-repeated criticisms of NATO ‘based on the argument that an alliance which safeguards Europe against Communist encroachments is nothing if the South Atlantic flank lies exposed to the Soviet fleet build-up’. The article concludes: ‘From the Portuguese point of view, however, it is not just in defence arrangements that she would like to interest the Brazilians. Dr Caetano has said time and again that he welcomes foreign participation in the African territories. The Brazilians seem well fitted to fill this role.’

Following Portuguese Prime Minister Caetano’s visit in July 1969, during August a high level Brazilian trade delegation visited Angola, Mozambique and South Africa for a month. This was the first mission of its kind ever undertaken in Southern Africa.

Response in Britain

South Africa’s new defence calculations strike an answering chord in Britain. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Former British Prime Minister and now Conservative spokesman on Foreign Affairs, argues that the closure of the Suez Canal has made South Africa strategically a more important country to the West. Many more ships are now using the Cape sea route around Africa. When on a visit to South Africa in February 1968, he stressed that the Cape route is ‘the main artery to the Western world and must be kept secure’. He went on to suggest that ‘NATO should concern itself with helping South Africa to defend this sea-route’. He assured the South Africans that a Conservative Government would reverse Britain’s anti-apartheid arms embargo. ‘Your Ministers would like to buy British’, he said: ‘We certainly would like to sell British’.

Later, in July 1968, in a Ditchley Foundation Lecture, Sir Alec spoke about South Africa in the context of the world balance of power: ‘Economically and strategically, geography has placed her well. As long as the oil-age lasts she will have a key position in the protection of the sea lanes leading to Western Europe. That fact, taken together with the Soviet Union’s forward maritime policy is a new element in the balance of power. While, in addition, South Africa is rich and seeks to deploy her resources in investment inside a continent where money talks. It so happens that Britain has a defence agreement with South Africa which concerns the Simonstown Naval Base not far from Cape Town. Under its terms, in the event of hostile action east of Suez, Britain has the use of all South African ports including Durban. I forecast that this facility will be of great value in terms of the defence of Western Europe from interference with her oil supplies and that it will in effect become an informal extension of the NATO defences, although it will remain a bilateral treaty.’

Again, a year later, in July 1969, in a newspaper article entitled Why the Tories will sell arms to South Africa, Sir Alec Douglas-Home said there was an additional reason for reverting to this practice: ‘With the closing of the Suez Canal and the permanent routeing of the oil of the Persian Gulf round the
shores of Africa and the simultaneous appearance of a Soviet submarine fleet which is oceanic in its range, South Africa’s geographical position assumes a new strategic significance. The policing of the South Atlantic and of the west of the Indian Ocean becomes important both to Britain and to Western Europe. These areas are in effect (although they may not formally be made so) an extension of NATO’s responsibility for the security of Europe. \[29\]

The South African Government would welcome the return of the Conservative Party to office. Their policies regarding defence arrangements with the South Africans are likely to be more favourable to the Republic, and Britain may well haul South Africa out of her international political isolation by making her, formally, an integral part of the Western defence system. South Africa wishes to become formally associated with Western defence: her economic power is a tremendous attraction to Western nations and the newly formed naval and military powers, with modern maritime facilities, are aimed to increase South Africa’s attractiveness as an ally: indeed, to make her appear almost indispensable to the West.

**Support in the United States**

It appears that the United States has also not fulfilled South Africa’s military expectations. Clearly, any formal military alliance with South Africa could have certain serious political disadvantages for the major Western Power. The idea has been considered, however, and in 1967 a military writer, General S. L. A. Marshall, was commissioned to write a paper entitled *South Africa: The Strategic View* for the right-wing American-African Affairs Association. In referring to the Suez closure the author states that ‘the loop around the Cape is becoming a bargain for the oil companies. The 300,000-ton tanker can deliver oil to western Europe at around $2.33 per ton while the tanker going through Suez (less than 70,000 tons) lays it down for $3.32 the ton.’

General Marshall says: ‘Seeing the globe as a whole, the Cape is an anchor position’. He then quotes Admiral Arthur W. Radford, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who on visiting Cape Town in October 1967 said to the South Africans, ‘You are now at the crossroads of the world both economically and militarily’.

General Marshall’s study goes on: ‘Possibly with some exaggeration, the writer, E. S. Virpsha, in an article written for the NATO audience, summed up this way: ‘From an overall view the strategic position of South Africa is next in importance to that of Western Europe and North America combined. Not only does it stand as a bulwark against the conquest of the whole of Africa but it occupies the most important central position in the Southern Hemisphere at the junction of the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans . . .

‘Americans who like to have a globe at hand when they think on our international problems—and there are probably fewer such Americans than there are problems—should take note of that part of oceania extending from the southwest end
of the Indian Ocean just a few miles east of Cape Town to the northern reaches of the Western Pacific where the Kuriles begin. In all that expanse which, with the virtually unpatrolled Indian Ocean included as a whole, comprises about one-quarter of the globe, there are only three truly solid positions. By solid, I mean that they are land masses in the hands of governments capable of functioning as a direct influence in world affairs, being backed by a strong people, and I mean further that they are disposed to string along with us. The Cape is at one extreme, Japan at the other, Australia in between. All other lands bordering on that spread of ocean are either in the hands of our enemies, or tenuously held by our side, or in that problematic category called "the third world".

‘Of these three bastions, it is South Africa that this year, 1967, plays the most dramatic, the least dispensable role, in keeping lamps lit and wheels turning around the world at a close-to-normal rate, despite the prolonged blocking of the Suez Canal which will certainly extend into 1968, and possibly beyond.’

A French Reaction

In the April 1968 issue of Perspective, published in London by the South Africa Foundation, a long article on South Africa’s role in Western defence was written by General Beaufré, leading French military writer, former Deputy Chief of Staff at NATO’s SHAPE headquarters, ex-French delegate to NATO and currently Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Paris. Referring to the domestic situation, General Beaufré wrote: ‘An unfavourable international atmosphere, however, can facilitate the start of racial troubles which might prove difficult to control or persistent or long-lasting. At one time, a few years ago, one wondered if the wave of decolonization sweeping Africa would not soon reach South Africa. These unfavourable prospects did not materialize; quite the contrary. This is because South Africa has a certain number of good trump cards, and, in addition, has benefited from the evolution in thinking that followed the fiasco of accelerated decolonization in the Congo.

‘A vast bloc in southern Africa is taking shape in which South African enterprise and capital could develop and exploit the latent natural resources. It is certain that this is within South Africa’s capabilities, and likely to produce there a degree of prosperity which the rest of Africa could not attain. This would be the best policy for it would ensure to southern Africa not only prosperity but also stability in the co-operation of the races living there.’

‘But this legitimate object, the effects of which would be considerable, presupposes the settling of a certain number of fundamental problems. The first is the harmonious cohabitation of different races. The problem is not new and presents no practical difficulties so long as it is not bound up with prejudice and hatred. The Middle East, which has lived for thousands of years with a complete mixture of races and religions, has traditionally applied a system of distinct and comparatively independent communities, federated on a local and regional
level by fairly simple machinery. In this way, the identity and a certain degree of autonomy were ensured for each of these communities, entities in which the dominant community was not always the most numerous. It appears that only along this path can a final solution be found. It should, nevertheless, be pointed out that when these communities are strongly opposed—as at present in Cyprus—peace is possible only by regrouping the communities in different territories. But there again—and the recent history of Israel is there to prove it—these regroupings do not ensure peace if racial or religious opposition persists. The problem is therefore, above all, to achieve the psychological conditions of friendly cohabitation. I think that to pave the way for such conditions the present formula of apartheid should be made considerably more flexible and that the black communities should receive a more extensive education as well as more dynamic development.

‘These improvements are essential, all the more so because the *sine qua non* of a dynamic policy in southern Africa is incontestably the agreement or at least the understanding of the super Powers. Unfortunately, the latter, because they are in opposition, practise a policy of overbidding with regard to the Third World which leads them to back or at least to encourage the “wind of change” which has risen over Africa....

‘A South African policy which does not disarm this opposition, based on principle, by some well-conceived reforms and by a big information effort, risks allowing a hostile atmosphere to build up and to harden. This would prevent her achieving that expansion by which she could give proof of her beneficent intentions for all southern Africa. Furthermore, after a shorter or longer interval, South Africa could be threatened by infiltrations capable of starting subversive movements. She would then be condemned to a defensive war which could only intensify racial animosity and call into question the very existence of South Africa.’

**SECTION V**

**South Africa’s Military Posture**

Since 1960 South Africa has embarked on a massive expansion of its armed forces, far beyond World War II levels. From a budget of £22m per year at the beginning of the decade, expenditure in 1969 is estimated at £200m."

For the fiscal year 1960-1 it amounted to £22m; in 1962-3 to over £60m; in 1964-5 to £105m (with £16½m spent on the manufacture of munitions in South Africa); in 1966-7 to £128m (including £23m for expenditure on Special Equipment to be bought mainly from overseas).†

Foreign interests are heavily involved in the arms build-up, both in the local manufacture of armaments and ammunition and in supplying the substantial proportion of equipment

*The 1969 Defence White Paper estimates a total defence expenditure of almost £1,000m (R1,647m) for the next five years.

†See Appendix I for detailed figures.
purchased from abroad.\textsuperscript{4}

But even this expanded military budget does not fully reflect the situation. The South African standing army is small and its salary cost is not very high; but the entire white population is armed and trained at low budgetary cost.

\textbf{South Africa's Monroe Doctrine}

South Africa cannot be considered in isolation. Her objective is to create, through a Southern African State System, a widely based economic and political grouping with the Republic as the major integrative factor. This system provides markets for South Africa's goods, investment opportunities for her capital and, most important, buffer states for the domestic apartheid system. The Republic's security frontier has already moved northwards, away from her own borders, to the Zambesi—but the new grouping is considered incomplete without Zambia and possibly the Congo and Tanzania.

In order to protect the \textit{status quo}, South African troops are fighting African resistance fighters in Rhodesia, and supporting Portuguese troops in Angola and Mozambique. Prime Minister Vorster says: 'We are prepared to fight terrorists wherever we are allowed to... If a neighbour's house is on fire you don't need an understanding or a treaty to go and help that neighbour to extinguish the fire.'

In the role of a regional power, South Africa also claims to be defending the interests of the West in that area: 'Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal are all very interested in the stability of Southern Africa, and we want to keep it that way—not only in our own interests, but in the interests of the free world'... (our italics).\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{Western Recognition for Regional Power?}

As the economic and military strength of South Africa grows, the prospect of direct military intervention in neighbouring territories increases. Professor Dennis Austin of Manchester University describes his 'own fears' in this direction. With an academic's caution he says: 'One cannot be sure that it (the Nationalist Government) will continue to resist the temptation to see South Africa as the arsenal and garrison-defender of an immense area of southern Africa up to the Congo, Zambia and Tanzania: 2m square miles, 30m Africans under 4m whites.'\textsuperscript{31} There is also the prospect that, in the face of this threat from a power with disproportionate military might, adjoining African states will feel compelled to invest, in an arms race, money which is desperately needed for internal development.

If Pretoria is not more explicit about its calculations for the subcontinent it is not so much because of any absence of such power aspirations but because she considers it of primary importance first to try to win Western recognition—if not open approval—for her regional role in Southern Africa.

\textsuperscript{4}The Johannesburg \textit{Star} of 26th April, 1969 reported, 'Armaments for the entire defence force since 1960 have cost R660,325,000 of which about R254m has been spent on aircraft. The assets and equipment of the defence force now amount to R2,000m.
Traditionally the West has considered developments in Central and Southern Africa as falling within Britain’s ‘sphere of influence’. How far are Western Governments prepared to accept South Africa as Britain’s successor and to reformulate their African foreign policies on the basis of South Africa’s supervening interest in Southern Africa? As shown earlier, Britain already appears to have accepted this position and as a result Pretoria is urging, with greater confidence, that the West should recognize her potential role as a military ally in the Southern Hemisphere.

Together with Portugal, the Republic could help to defend Western interests over a wide geographical area, with the future prospect of an almost Continental role. Portugal’s perspective is analogous to that put forward by South Africa. Defence Minister Nogueira said in 1968 that Portugal’s policy in Africa is not narrowly national; in defending its own interest, it is defending also those of the free world; in the face of the threat to the South Atlantic, Portugal holds, in the interests of the West, four archipelagos: the Azores, Madeira, Cape Verde Islands, and Sao Tome and Principe; in the Indian Ocean, also threatened, Portugal possesses magnificent ports and aerodromes.

Within such a framework the off-shore territories around Africa such as Mauritius, the Malagasy Republic and the Ascension and St Helena Islands, together with South Africa’s modern ports, submarine bases, aerodromes and Caprivi-type land bases could be integrated into an overall Western defence network mainly operated by South Africa and Portugal (with the collaboration of the other Hemispheric partners). This prospect may be dismissed by some outside observers as unrealistic but those who devise these plans are in earnest.

Regional Intervention in African States?

South Africa claims an overriding interest in all major political developments within and between neighbouring territories and it is in pursuit of this interest that she has sent armed forces into neighbouring Unholy Alliance countries. But this strategy has grave implications for independent African states. Already the South African Air Force operates regular reconnaissance flights over countries without the means to detect or deter such incursions; intelligence operations beyond South Africa’s own borders are to be intensified by the newly established BOSS network.*

Should indirect methods of influencing domestic political changes in neighbouring states produce unsatisfactory results, will South Africa carry out her threats of taking ‘Israeli-type’ action against those whom she accuses of ‘harbouring guerrillas’? And in other cases where she perceives domestic political changes in neighbouring countries as threatening her wider regional interests, will such changes precipitate

*Lt-General van den Bergh has been appointed Director of BOSS. He is accountable direct to the Prime Minister, and Parliament is not able to ask for details of the Bureau’s operations. Prime Minister Vorster and Lt-General van den Bergh shared wartime internment for their pro-Nazi views.
direct military intervention?

African states which develop close economic and political links with South Africa will discover that their 'client-state' relationships become a source of conflict with other African states as well as with their own populations. As has happened elsewhere, South Africa will not only create dependent states but also dependent regimes which will find it necessary to rely increasingly on external support from South Africa in order to remain in power. No long-term policy of economic and political collaboration with South Africa is likely to become acceptable among Africans, who consider apartheid an affront to their dignity and human worth. When the conflict within South Africa turns into a major violent confrontation large sections of African people in the rest of the Continent will identify themselves with the resistance fighters in Southern Africa and come into open conflict with those Governments which maintain co-operation with South Africa.

Any African policy based on the racialism of South Africa is likely to prove disastrous for those who practise such a policy, as well as for their countries.

Conclusion

In a world where the boundaries of race and poverty coincide so directly, the coloured world is increasingly likely to determine its attitude to white Western countries on the basis of their record on issues of race and colour. Countries which are intimately linked with the white regimes in Southern Africa are not likely to win high esteem and for those, such as the United States and Britain, with internal discrimination against their coloured minorities, links with South Africa can serve as an added source of internal racial conflict. The domestic and international aspects of race-relations situations are closely interlinked and need to be seen in a global context. It is also important to appreciate that racist groups abroad derive considerable inspiration and support from the existence of white South Africa.

Through its diplomatic and military links, South Africa has over the years established close contacts within military circles in Western countries. The military 'brass' and the arms industries in these countries are now the best allies of South Africa—they constantly urge closer relationships with the Republic. Together with certain influential politicians and businessmen they constitute a formidable pro-South Africa lobby. If the major Western Powers in fact enter into closer military relationships with South Africa, this will have grave effects on the relationships between these Powers and the coloured world, as well as on the course of the liberation struggle in southern Africa as a whole.

Even without a formal military alliance there is considerable risk of Western countries getting drawn into South Africa's conflict. In addition to the other pressures, in the event of a violent confrontation certain Governments will face demands from relatives and friends of recent European migrant settlers in South Africa to act on behalf of their former citizens, if not the other white 'kith and kin'. As links
with South Africa increase, Western Governments become ever more reluctant to support international action against South Africa while at the same time they come under increased pressure to become more pro-South African—with the risk of direct intervention in the future to preserve the status quo.

Larry W. Bowman, of Brandeis University, Mass., expressed his view in 1968: ‘The greatest long-term threat which Southern Africa poses to world stability is, in my opinion, the very real possibility that left-leaning guerrilla movements will one day be near success, only to have the West intervene on the side of the whites.’

It is ultimately the oppressed people in Southern Africa who will, by their own struggle, themselves overthrow white supremacy and win liberation. In an effort to minimize human suffering, the Liberation Movement has urged international supporting action to help end apartheid, but at the United Nations and elsewhere Western Governments have successfully blocked all meaningful action to counteract apartheid. Simultaneously, growing internal repression within South Africa has forced the oppressed majority to resort to armed struggle.

It is not the Liberation Movement which wants a race war in Southern Africa. It is the white rulers and their supporters, both at home and abroad, who have brought about a bitter racial conflict by denying to the African, Indian and Coloured peoples all basic political and human rights. Despite the nature of this conflict, many white South Africans have participated—and died—in the struggle for liberation. No doubt, in future, many others will do the same. The African liberation struggle is not a narrow racial struggle but one to bring about a democratic South Africa.

The Liberation Movement still considers that outside support can help reduce the otherwise enormous suffering involved in the struggle. It is not inviting volunteers from foreign countries to risk their lives in the Southern African resistance battles. Instead, it appeals for action to bring about an end to Western involvement on the side of the apartheid system—it urges the withdrawal of foreign investment and foreign nationals as part of an overall policy of disengagement from the arena of conflict. Many individuals and groups in Western countries are working for this objective. Among them are a growing number who are willing to give direct moral and material assistance to the Liberation Movement. The extent of this support will serve as a demonstration of active concern for human liberation in South and southern Africa. In the context of a racial struggle it becomes doubly important for large numbers of white people in Western countries to ally themselves with the cause of liberation and thereby help reduce the high human cost of that struggle.

When the South African conflict develops into a major violent confrontation it is likely to be on such a scale as to make other revolutions look more like local skirmishes. The South African Government, with all the resources of a modern technological society, will not shrink from utilizing its con-
siderable military power against the domestic African popu-
lation. It is bound to be a bitter and protracted struggle, likely
to engulf the African Continent, and with the risk of a major
world conflict.

The outbreak of widespread violence inside South Africa
will further unite the coloured world against South Africa and
those Governments which render it aid and comfort—with
all the grave implications of a global racial confrontation
which can only spell disaster for humanity as a whole.

Many claim that there is still time . . . that the conflict
in South Africa will take many years before it develops into
a violent confrontation between the forces of liberation and
the Government. This is not so. Battles are taking place now.

We must support the Liberation Movement and extricate
Western Governments from involvement with the apartheid
system, for if these Governments do not withdraw from the
arena of conflict they serve only to prolong and intensify the
liberation struggle and increase the risk of direct military
intervention. But even if they do not intervene directly,
Western Governments and their peoples will, by supporting
the white rulers in South Africa, share the responsibility for
the catastrophe which will be inflicted on humanity as a
whole.
REFERENCES

1. Full text of speech contained in *Labour’s Record on Southern Africa* by Anne Darnborough (June 1967). Available from the Anti-Apartheid Movement.


3. See United Nations document A/AC 115/L 252 15th May 1969 (Statement at 117th meeting of the Special Committee on Apartheid.)


9. 9th September, 1967.


15. 14th April, 1969.


25. 6th May, 1969.


APPENDIX I

MILITARY FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

A. Budget Estimates for Defence

The financial requirements for defence have been estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimate of expenditure for defence (in millions of Rands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-1961</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1962</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1964</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A Rand is equivalent to $US 1.40 or 10 shillings)


Some items of expenditure where increases in budget estimates have been impressive include:

(Rand) (Rand)
Army stores, services and equipment 2,620,000 11,241,000
Aircraft, aircraft stores, services and equipment 2,628,000 29,232,000
Naval stores, services and equipment 2,339,000 11,804,000
Bombs, ammunition and pyrotechnics 297,000 23,300,500
Mechanical transport, horses and dogs 1,648,000 15,310,500
Special equipment and reserve stocks 4,500,000 45,750,000
Manufacture of munitions 368,000 44,900,000


APPENDIX II

IMPORTS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EXCLUDING SOUTH WEST AFRICA TERRITORY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>£ millions</th>
<th>£ millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 6</td>
<td>10,053,331</td>
<td>85,614,517</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 7</td>
<td>1,298,061</td>
<td>2,597,833</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8</td>
<td>664,869</td>
<td>786,378</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6+7+8 (A)</td>
<td>11,996,261</td>
<td>88,998,378</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports (B)</td>
<td>126,605,371</td>
<td>219,567,257</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A as % B approxiamately 9.5 40.5

Section 6=Manufactured Goods classified chiefly by material
Section 7=Machinery and Transport equipment
Section 8=Miscellaneous manufactured articles

APPENDIX III: SOUTH AFRICA — Some Basic Facts.

Area: 472,359 square miles.

Population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Proportion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>12.7 million</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>3.6 million</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>1.9 million</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>0.5 million</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18.7 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Education:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Proportion of state expenditure spent on each race in 1965/6:</th>
<th>Per capita expenditure in Rand:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>74.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>26.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: South African Institute of Race Relations — Annual Survey of Race Relations 1967 page 266.

Life Expectancy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Life Expectancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>40 - 45 years (estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>64.6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>44.8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>55.8 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Economist 29th June, 1968

Incidence of Tuberculosis (per 100,000 of population) — 1967:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Incidence of Tuberculosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>460.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>436.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>204.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Wages in Mining: Average earnings per daily shift — 1966:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Average Earnings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>£6 16s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>8s. 10d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ratio Whites/Africans 15.2 : 1

Source: Financial Mail 10th May, 1968

Executions: Between July 1963 and June 1965, 281 death sentences were passed in South Africa, and of these 194 were carried out, accounting for 47% of the world total of lawful executions in this period. This makes an average of 2 executions every week.

Map 1  Southern Africa